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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the active fault tolerant control (FTC) problem for an Internet-based networked three-
tank system (INTTS) serving as a benchmark system for evaluating networked FTC algorithms. The INTTS has two
parts located at Tsinghua University in China and at the University of South Wales in the UK, respectively, which are
connected via Internet. With the INTTS as an experimental platform, the active FTC problem is investigated for a class
of nonlinear networked systems subject to partial actuator failures. A binary switching random sequence with a known
distribution is employed to describe the packet dropout phenomena induced by network cables with limited-capacity.
Once a specic actuator failure is detected and conrmed by a fault diagnosis unit, the control law is then recongured
based on the information of the detected fault. Both the stability and the H1 disturbance attenuation performance
are guaranteed for the closed-loop system by using the remaining reliable actuators. Extensive experiments are carried
out on the active fault tolerant control problem of the INTTS with partial actuator failures and the eectiveness of the
proposed scheme is illustrated.
Keywords
Active fault tolerant control, Internet-based networked three-tank system, actuator failure, controller reconguration,
random packet dropout.
I. Introduction
Manufactured by the Amira Automation Company in Germany, the Three-Tank System (TTS)
DTS 200 has been used as a benchmark system to evaluate the algorithms for the fault detection
and diagnosis (FDD) problems and the fault tolerant control (FTC) problems in the past decades.
So far, the TTS DTS 200 has been widely adopted in developing FDD and/or FTC techniques due
mainly to the facts that its nonlinear mathematical model can be precisely established and the leak-
age/sensor/actuator faults can be easily realized in the equipment manually. The prole of DTS 200
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Fig. 1. A benchmark system: DTS 200
is shown in Fig. 1 and the detailed description of this system can be found in [1, 2]. Based on this
benchmark system, much work has been done on FDD and/or FTC problems, see e.g. [3{9].
The rapid development of network technologies has recently stimulated wide applications of the
so-called networked systems (NSs). The NSs are dened as the control/sensing systems using com-
munication network cable to exchange data (instead of using ideal point-to-point wires). This kind
of systems has many advantages as compared with the traditional point-to-point systems and many
successful applications have been reported in the literature during the past ten years [10, 11]. To
better verify the networked ltering/FDD/FTC algorithms, we have modied the TTS into the so-
called Internet-based networked three-tank system (INTTS) [2]. The INTTS has been built up by
using the NetCon platform [12] that connects the TTS at Tsinghua University in China and the con-
troller/fault diagnosis unit at the University of South Wales in the UK through Internet, see Fig. 2.
Based on the INTTS, the problems of networked state estimation, fault detection and isolation as well
as fault tolerant control have been investigated [13,14]. Note that the main diculties in dealing with
these networked analysis/design problems stem from the incomplete signal phenomena in a networked
environment, which include communication delays, packet dropouts, signal quantizations as well as
multiple packet transmissions. These phenomena hinder the direct usage of traditional FDD/FTC
algorithms on networked systems [16,17].
An FTC system is a closed-loop control system capable of maintaining its stability and desired
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Fig. 2. Setup of INTTS
performance even in the presence of faults [18]. The analytical redundancy-based FTCS can generally
be classied into two categories: the passive FTCS where controllers are designed xedly to be robust
against a specic class of faults as well as the active FTCS where the system component failures are
reacted actively and the controller is recongured to accommodate the faults, see [19{21]. FTC results
for traditional systems can be found in [22, 23]. However, compared with the fruitful FDD results for
networked systems, the FTC problems in networked environments have gained relatively less research
attention and the corresponding results have been scattered [24,25].
It should be noticed that most existing FTC results for NSs have been concerned with the passive
FTC strategies. For a passive FTC strategy, the same controller is used before and after the fault
occurrence, and this may give rise to the inability for the controlled system to achieve its best perfor-
mance in the healthy case. Apparently, it would be less conservative yet more challenging to research
into the active FTC problem for NCSs than its passive counterpart. Unfortunately, to date, there have
been very few results reported for the FTC problems of NCSs especially in the practical applications.
Furthermore, as is well known, the plant and signal are inevitably simulant for numerical simulations
and, therefore, it is of more signicance to consider a physical system in order to better verify and
implement the designed FTC algorithms and methods in practice.
In [15], an active fault tolerant control problem has been investigated for an INTTS with partial
actuator faults, where only the linear case has been considered. In our present paper, a more realistic
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nonlinear system model of INTTS is employed, based on which the active fault tolerant control problem
is thoroughly investigated. The main contributions of this paper are highlighted as follows: 1) an active
fault tolerant control problem is studied for a nonlinear networked system with partial actuator failures,
where the addressed kind of nonlinearity is more general than the usually investigated Lipschitz-type
nonlinearity; 2) a new fault isolation technique is proposed which is proven to be more ecient than
the residual contribution degree approach proposed in [2]; 3) experiments over a practical INTTS are
conducted and the proposed techniques are veried via a real networked system.
Notation. The notations used throughout this paper are fairly standard. Rn and Rnm denote,
respectively, the n dimensional Euclidean space and the set of all n  m real matrices. P > 0
(respectively, P < 0) means that the matrix P is real, symmetric and positive denite (respectively,
negative denite). The subscript \T" denotes the matrix transpose. Prfg represents the occurrence
probability of the event , and Efyg is the mathematical expectation of a stochastic variable y. l2[0;1)
is the space of all square-summable vector functions over [0;1), and kxk is the standard l2 norm of
x, i.e., kxk = (xTx)1=2, and Z+ stands for the set of nonnegative integers. x(i) stands for the ith
component of vector x. In symmetric block matrices, we use \" to represent a term that is induced
by symmetry, Matrices, if their dimensions are not explicitly stated, are assumed to be compatible for
algebraic operations.
II. System Description and Problem Formulation
The controlled system considered in this paper is an INTTS that has been built as a benchmark
system for the evaluation of networked fault diagnosis and FTC algorithms. It connects the equipment
at Tsinghua University (Beijing, China) with that at the University of South Wales (Wales, UK)
through Internet. The whole INTTS system is composed of a TTS DTS200 [9], two NetCon equipment
used for the implementation of control and fault diagnosis algorithms as well as the Internet interface, a
networked camera used for real time on line monitoring, a PC used for downloading the algorithms and
operational observation, as well as the Internet used for data transmission. The hardware structure is
shown in Fig. 2, and the detailed description of INTTS can be found in [2].
In this paper, we are interested in investigating the active fault tolerant control problem for the
INTTS with partial actuator faults, see Fig. 3 for the block diagram. The random packet dropout
phenomena in both the forward and backward data transmission processes are taken into account.
Once an actuator fault is detected and isolated by the fault diagnosis unit comprising a fault detection
lter and a fault isolation strategy, the controller is recongured so as to guarantee system performance
by using the remaining reliable actuators.
After model simplication and discretization [2], the mathematical model of the TTS can be de-
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Fig. 3. Block diagram of the active fault tolerant control scheme
scribed by the following nonlinear discrete-time system:8>><>>:
xk+1 = Axk +Hg(xk) + Buk +Ddk;
zk = Exk;
yk = Cxk;
(1)
where xk 2 Rnx is the state vector (water levels in the three tanks); uk 2 Rnu is the control input
(water inow of the three pumps); dk 2 Rnd is the disturbance belonging to l2[0; 1); yk 2 Rny is
the measurement output (water heights in three tanks) and zk 2 Rnz is the controlled output (the
weighted average of the osets of the three water levels from the desired value). g(xk) is a vector-valued
nonlinear function satisfying the sector-bounded condition [27,28]
[g(xk)  T1xk]T [g(xk)  T2xk]  0; 8xk 2 Rnx ; (2)
where T1 and T2 are known real constant matrices and T = T1   T2 is symmetric positive denite
matrices. Let x0 2 Rnxrepresent the known initial condition. All the system matrices are known, real,
and constant with appropriate dimensions.
Remark 1: Since the three-tank system is essentially nonlinear, the term g(xk) is preserved in the
modeling process in order to characterize the nonlinearities resulting from the unmodeled dynamics,
linearization errors, external disturbances, etc. The nonlinearity descriptions in (2), called sector-
bounded nonlinearities, are quite general that include the usual Lipschitz conditions as a special case.
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Assumption 1: The measurement matrix of system (1), C, is a matrix with full column rank.
Due to limited bandwidth of the communication channel, data packets carrying measurement signals
or control signals could be lost during the transmission process and such phenomena can be modeled
by (
~yk = 1kyk;
uk = 2kvk;
(3)
where ~yk 2 Rny is the measurement received at the controller node and vk 2 Rnu is the control signal
calculated in the same place before being transmitted to the plant. 1k and 2k are two Bernoulli dis-
tributed stochastic variables that reect the random data dropouts occurred in the sensor-to-controller
channel and controller-to-actuator channel, respectively.
Assumption 2: The mathematical expectations
Ef1kg = 1 and Ef2kg = 2;
as well as the correlation coecient  between 1k and 2k are all known scalars that can be obtained
a priori through statistical tests, see [29].
In the present work, we focus on the situation where the data transmission process may suer from
random packet dropout and partial actuator faults. We are interested in the analysis and design
problem of an active fault-tolerant controller, which includes a fault diagnosis unit followed by a
controller reconguration strategy. The fault diagnosis, unit is used to detect and locate the faulty
actuator. Once an actuator fault is diagnosed, the control gain is then recongured to a proper one
corresponding to the faulty actuator. The plant is stabilized with certain performance achieved via
manipulating the remaining reliable actuators before the faulty actuator is repaired or replaced.
Consider a fault detection lter of the following form:(
~xk+1 = G~xk +N ~yk +Mvk;
rk = L~xk:
(4)
where ~xk is the lter state and rk is the residual signal that indicates whether there is a fault. G, N ,
M and L are the lter parameters to be designed.
The controller is chosen as follows:
vk = KFTC ~yk; (5)
where
KFTC =
(
Kh; Fault free
Kf ; Actuator faults
(6)
The control gains, in both the faulty case and the fault free case, will be designed within an H1
framework. Furthermore, the fault tolerant controller (with respect to partial actuator faults) can be
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realized with the following strategy: when there is no fault detected, a normal H1 control gain Kh is
utilized and, once some specic actuator faults are conrmed, the control gain is switched to Kf that
is designed according to the faulty actuators.
Assumption 3: Although fault may occur with one or more actuators, the whole system can still be
stabilized by the remaining reliable actuators.
Assumption 4: here is at most one fault that can occur at a certain time instant.
We are now in a position to state the main problems to be addressed in this paper. The purpose of
this paper is to deal with the following three interrelated problems.
Problem 1: Design an H1 controller (6) for system (1) with gain Kf in the fault-free situation.
Problem 2: Design a fault detection lter (4) for system (1) and a fault isolation strategy to
diagnose the actuator fault.
Problem 3: Design an H1 fault tolerant control law (6) for system (1) with gains Kf corresponding
to the controller with a specic failure actuator. Once an actuator fault is determined, the control
gain is switched to Kf .
Remark 2: Note that Problem 1 is actually a special case of Problem 3 if no fault occurs, and this
indicates that Problem 1 can be solved by solving Problem 3 with a constraint that there is no actuator
fault.
III. Main Results
In this section, the main results of this paper are obtained that include the design of a fault diagnosis
unit and a controller reconguration strategy.
Let 
  f1; 2; : : : ; nug denote the set of actuators that are susceptible to fail and 
 = f1; 2; : : : ; nugn

represent the set of reliable actuators. Based on this, the matrix B can be decomposed as
B = B! +B!; (7)
where B! and B! are determined from B by setting the columns corresponding to 
 and 
 as zeros,
respectively. The outputs of the faulty actuators u!k are considered to be arbitrary signals belonging
to l2[0;1), which can be regarded as external disturbances of the system. The output of the reliable
actuators u!k is used for the control purpose.
A. The Fault Diagnosis Unit
A.1 The Residual Generation Filter Design
By introducing an auxiliary term, system (1) can be rewritten as8>><>>:
xk+1 = Axk +Hg(xk) +Buk +Ddk +B!fk;
zk = Exk;
yk = Cxk;
(8)
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where fk 2 Rnu is the fault signal and B! is the same as dened in (7).
Remark 3: Note that B!fk is employed to characterize the actuator fault. fk = 0 represents the
normal case with no fault; fk =  uk corresponds to the case that there is one or more actuator failure
faults; and fk = uk describes partial actuator gain faults with a gain 1 + .
Dene k =
h
xTk ~x
T
k
iT
, k =
h
fTk d
T
k
iT
and ~rk = rk fk. According to (3)-(5) and (8), we have
the following augmented system:(
k+1 = Ak + (k   )Xk + Hg(Zk) +Bk;
~rk = Ck +Dk:
(9)
where k := 1k2k,  = Efkg and
A =
"
A+ BKhC 0
(N +MKhC) G
#
;
X =
"
BKhC 0
(N +MKhC) 0
#
; H =
"
H
0
#
;
B =
"
B! D
0 0
#
; C =
h
0 L
i
;
D =
h
 I 0
i
; Z =
h
I 0
i
: (10)
From the above manipulations, the original fault detection lter design problem can be converted into
an H1 lter design problem. Moreover, Problem 2 can be reformulated as follows: design a fault
detection lter of the form (4) such that, for all possible packet dropouts, the augmented system (9)
is asymptotically mean-square stable [30] and the H1 disturbance attenuation level
1X
k=0
E
k~rkk2	  21 1X
k=0
E
kkk2	 (11)
is achieved for a prescribed scalar 1.
The following theorem is provided to solve Problem 2.
Theorem 1: Consider the INTTS (1), (3) and (5) with a given control gain Kh. For possible partial
actuator faults, a desired fault detection lter exists if there exist matrices 0 < V T = V 2 Rnxnx ,
0 < F T = F 2 Rnxnx , G 2 Rnxnx , N 2 Rnxny , M 2 Rnxnu , L 2 Rnunx , as well as a scalar  such
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that the following linear matrix inequality (LMI) holds26666666666666666666664
 I 0 0 0 0 0
  V  F 0 0 26
   F 0 0 36
    V  F 46
     F 56
      V   T1
     
     
     
     
  
  
L 0  I 0
27 0 0 0
37 0 0 0
47 V H V B! V D
57 FH FB! FD
 F   T1  T2 0 0
 F   T1  T2 0 0
  I 0 0
   21I 0
    21I
37777777777777777777775
< 0; (12)
where 26 = V BKhC +  NC +  MKhC, 27 = V BKhC +  NC +  MKhC, 36 = FBKhC,
37 = FBKhC, 46 = V A + V BKhC +  NC +  MKhC, 47 = V A + V BKhC +  NC +
 MKhC+ G, 56 = FA+FBKhC, 57 = FA+FBKhC,  =
p
(1  ), T1 = (T T1 T2+T T2 T1)=2,
T2 =  (T T1 + T T2 )=2, and  = E f1k2kg = 
p
12(1  1)(1  2) + 12. Furthermore, if (12) is
feasible, the gain matrices of the desired fault detection lter are given by
G = (F   V ) 1 G; N = (F   V ) 1 N;
M = (F   V ) 1 M; L = L: (13)
Proof: The proof can be conducted along the similar line of Theorem 1 in [31] by using the
techniques developed in [27, 28] to handle the nonlinearity, and therefore the proof is omitted for
brevity.
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A.2 Fault Detection Strategy
Having generated the residual by the fault detection lter, we consider a residual evaluation function:
Jk =
(
kX
s=0
rTs rs
)1=2
: (14)
It can be inferred that the output of the residual evaluation function Jk is a scalar at a certain time
instant k. The occurrence of the faults can be alarmed by comparing J(k) with a prescribed threshold
Jth according to the following rule:
Jk;L > JLth =) fault detected;
Jk;L  JLth =) no faults; (15)
where
Jk;L := Jk   Jk L; JLth = sup
k2Z+; dk2l2; fk=0
E

Jk   Jk L
	
: (16)
and L is the length of a time window considered for evaluating the residual for a fault alarm.
A.3 Fault Isolation Strategy
Consider a new vector ~Jk whose ith component is given by
~J
(i)
k :=
(
kX
s=0
(r(i)s )
2
)1=2
(17)
which is called the fault isolation residual evaluation signal. Once an actuator fault is detected, a
Weighted Residual Component Comparison (WRCC) approach is employed to locate the fault. The
main idea of the WRCC approach is explained as follows.
Let OA(1; 2; : : : ; n) denote an ordered array with 1 < 2 < : : : < n for a set f1; 2; : : : ; ng.
SE
(n)
 is dened as the set of all possible ordered arrays. It is obvious that OA(1; 2; : : : ; n) 2 SE(n) .
Note that, for an nu-dimensional fault input, ~J
(i)
k can be generated by the fault detection lter designed
in Subsection III-A.1.
At the time instant kd when the fault is detected, there is a set f ~J (1)kd ; ~J
(2)
kd
; : : : ; ~J
(nu)
kd
g, where the nu
components of the residual evaluation signal ~Jkd are its elements. For an arbitrary fault vector fk, if
one can nd a set of scalars f1; 2; : : : ; nug such that, for any 1 < i < nu, J (i)kd = i ~J
(i)
kd
, then there
exists a subset SB
(nu)
J
 SE(nu)J that has one-to-one mapping with the fault set ff
(1)
kd
; f
(2)
kd
; : : : ; f
(nu)
kd
g.
Once the scalars are determined, we can obtain an ordered array at the time instant kd and, if it
belongs to SB
(nu)
J
, we can isolate the fault based on the one-to-one mapping relationship.
Remark 4: In the practical fault diagnosis over the INTTS, it can be observed that the faults oc-
curring in the same position lead to the same residual form no matter how much the amplitude of the
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faults is. In view of this, we propose the aforementioned WRCC approach to isolate the possible fault.
Compared with the fault isolation method based on the residual contribution degree (RCD) proposed
in [2], this approach can utilize more information from the residual evaluation signal as opposed to
simply comparing the magnitudes of its components. Furthermore, for the subset SE
(nu)
J
, there are
nu! elements in total and it is generally easy to nd a subset SB
(nu)
J
with nu elements which has a
one-to-one mapping with the fault set.
B. Fault Tolerant Controller Design
Let us now design a fault tolerant control strategy. Denoting wk =
h
uT!k d
T
k
iT
, we can rewrite
the closed-loop dynamics as(
xk+1 = Axk + (k   )Xxk +Hg(xk) + Bwk;
zk = Cxk;
(18)
where A = A+ B!KC, X = B!KC, B = [B! D], C = E.
As pointed out in Remark 2, Problem 1 can be regarded as a special case of Problem 3 with a
constraint 
 = ?. This indicates that, in both the faulty case and fault-free case, the control gain (6)
of a fault tolerant controller (5) can be determined by solving Problem 3. The main procedure is to
nd a fault tolerant control gain Kf such that, for a specic actuator fault, the whole system (18) is
asymptotically mean-square stable [30] and the H1 disturbance attenuation level from wk to zk
1X
k=0
E
kzkk2	  22 1X
k=0
E
kwkk2	 (19)
is made as small as possible.
In this subsection, a performance analysis result is rstly provided for a known controller, based on
which a fault tolerant controller can be further designed.
Theorem 2: Consider the INTTS (1) and (3) with a given control law (5) and a specic actuator
faults 
. For a given scalar 2, the closed-loop system (18) is asymptotically mean-square stable and
a prescribed H1 attenuation level is achieved if there are a positive denite matrix P = P T > 0 and
a scalar  such that 266666666664
 P 0 PX 0 0 0
  P PA PH PB 0
   P   T1P  T2 0 CT
    I 0 0
     22I 0
      I
377777777775
< 0 (20)
holds where T1, T2, and  are the same as dened in Theorem 1.
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Proof: Let P > 0 and consider a Lyapunov function of the following form:
Vk = x
T
kPxk: (21)
In the case of wk = 0, we take the following relationship into consideration"
xk
g(xk)
#T "
T1 T2
T T2 I
#"
xk
g(xk)
#
 0:
For a positive scalar , we have
Vk = EfVk+1g   Vk = E

xTk+1Pxk+1
	  xTkPxk

"
xk
g(xk)
#T

("
ATPA+ 2X TPX   P ATPH
 HTPH
#
 
"
T1 T2
 I
#"
P 0
0 I
#)

"
xk
g(xk)
#
:=
"
xk
g(xk)
#T
	
"
xk
g(xk)
#
: (22)
From Schur Complement Lemma, 	 < 0 is equivalent to2666664
 P 0 p(1  )PX 0
  P PA PH
   P   T1  T2
    I
3777775 < 0: (23)
It follows from (20) that (23) holds, i.e., Vk < 0. Therefore, it can be conrmed that the closed-loop
system (18) is asymptotically mean-square stable [30].
Let us now consider the H1 disturbance rejection attenuation performance. In the zero initial state
situation, for any wk 6= 0, we can obtain Vk + E

zTk zk
	   22EwTk wk	 < 0. Summing up this
inequality from 0 to 1 with respect to k yields
1X
k=0
E
jzkj2	 < 22 1X
k=0
E
jwkj2	  E fV1g+ E fV0g ;
which implies that (19) is true and the proof is now complete.
Theorem 2 provides a fault tolerant controller analysis result for a given controller. The design
procedure of the fault tolerant controller is outlined in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3: Consider the INTTS (1) with network-induced packet dropouts (3). For a given scalar
2, in case that the actuators in 
 fail, there exists a control law (5) such that the closed-loop system
(18) is asymptotically mean-square stable and the prescribed H1 disturbance attenuation level (19)
is fullled if there exist matrices X = XT > 0, K and a scalar  satisfying266666666666664
 X 0 B! K
  X AX + B! K
   X   XT1
  
  
  
  
  
  
0 0 0 0
H B! D 0
 XT2 0 0 XET
 I 0 0 0
  22I 0 0
 0  22I 0
    I
377777777777775
< 0; (24)
where  is dened in Theorem 1. Moreover, if (24) holds, the desired control law can be obtained from
the following equation:
K = KX 1Cy: (25)
where Cy is the left inverse matrix of C.
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Proof: From the denitions of A, X , B and C, (20) can be rewritten as266666666666664
 P 0 PB!KC
  P PA+ PB!KC
   P   T1P
  
  
  
  
  
  
0 0 0 0
PH PB! PD 0
 T2 0 0 ET
 I 0 0 0
  22I 0 0
   22I 0
    I
377777777777775
< 0: (26)
Dening X = P 1 and performing the congruence transformation to (26) by diag fX; X; X; I; I; Ig,
we obtain (24) by introducing a new matrix variable K = KCX. This is equivalent to (20). According
to Theorem 2, the closed-loop system (18) is asymptotically mean-square stable and also satises (19).
If (23) is solvable, from the full column property of C and X, we can obtain the control law from (25)
and this concludes the proof.
Remark 5: Although the condition in Theorem 3 guaranteeing the existence of a satisfactory fault
tolerant controller is a nonlinear matrix inequality in terms of the product of  and X, we could rst x
the variable  and solve the optimization problem by using the interior-point methods, then decrease
 and repeat the optimization procedure until we achieve a minimum disturbance attenuation level .
Algorithm 1: The whole active fault tolerant control algorithm can be implemented for INTTS
according to the following steps:
Step 1: System Modeling.
Setup the mathematical model of the INTTS, determine system parameters and choose proper
parameters of the sector-bounded nonlinearity.
Step 2: Residual Generation Filter design.
Design a residual generation lter in the form of (4) using Theorem 1.
Step 3: H1 Controller Design.
Calculate the parameters of the controllers in the form of (5) by using Theorem 3. Both the controller
for fault free case and the faulty case are designed.
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Step 4: Determine Threshold Jth. Based on the output of the residual evaluation signal, determine
a proper time length L in (16) and a threshold for the sake of detect the fault, using the logic
(15). Equation (16) is a theoretical formula of a threshold, however, in practice, we use Monte Carlo
experiments to get a best threshold.
Step 5: Alarm the Fault. By comparing the output Jk of the residual evaluation function and the
predened threshold Jth, one can alarm the fault and get the fault detected time kd, which is dened
as the rst time Jk exceeds Jth.
Step 6: Isolate the Fault. By using the WRCC approach, one can isolate the fault.
Step 7: Recongure the Control Law. Use the fault information provided by the fault diagnosis
unit, recongure the controller to the H1 control law a prior designed without the failure actuator.
IV. experimental results
To illustrate the eectiveness of the proposed methodology, in this section, we conducted two exper-
iments on the INTTS. Parameters of TTS can be found in [1] and the packet dropout property of the
Internet can be obtained from experiments, see [2] for details. Dierent from [2], in our experiments,
data packets over communication network with delays larger than one step are discarded and only
missing eects are considered.
In a real TTS, there are two pumps supplying water for Tank 1 and Tank 2. Three sensors are
equipped for measuring the water levels in Tank 1, Tank 2, and Tank 3, respectively. Consider that
the nominal water inow is u1 = 3 10 5(m3=s), u2 = 2 10 5(m3=s), then the equilibrium point of
TTS is h1 = 0:318(m), h2 = 0:151(m), h3 = 0:231(m). The states of the system are water heights of
Tanks 1  3; the inputs are inows of pumps 1  2; the measurements are the same as the system
states since C = I; and the controlled outputs are the deviations of the real water levels from their
setpoints. Choosing a sampling time Ts = 1(s), the simplied mathematical model (1) is obtained
after the discretization treatment. This model is in incremental form and its parameters are given as
follows:
A =
2664
0:9889 0:0001 0:0110
0:0001 0:9774 0:0119
0:0110 0:0119 0:9770
3775 ; B = D =
2664
64:5993 0:0015
0:0015 64:2236
0:3604 0:3909
3775 ;
C = I3; H = I3; E = [0:3 0:6 0:1] :
Based on some preliminary experiments, we have the nonlinearity term g(xk) bounded by (2) with
the following parameters:
T1 = 1 10 5  I3 and T1 = 1:5 10 5  I3;
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from which we can get
T1 = 1:5 10 10  I3 and T2 =  1:25 10 5  I3:
For the packet dropout phenomenon, we get 1 = 2 = 0:9 and  = 1 from some tests, and therefore
we have  = 0:9. For a fault-free system (
 = ?), we set  = 1 and use Theorem 3 to obtain an
sub-optimal H1 disturbance attenuation level h = 65:6611 with the following control gain
Kh =
"
 0:0160  0:0012  0:0387
 0:0005  0:0163 0:0163
#
:
Assume that at most one pump may fail during the simulation. Again, using Theorem 3, we can
obtain the following fault tolerant control gains with respect to the failures of Pump 1 and Pump 2:
Kf1 =
"
0 0 0
 0:0086  0:0169  0:0032
#
;
Kf2 =
"
 0:0170  0:0336  0:0062
0 0 0
#
:
Also, the corresponding H1 disturbance attenuation levels are calculated as f1 = 72:0335 and f2 =
88:1046. It can be seen that both of them are larger than h.
As for the fault detection lter, Theorem 1 is utilized to obtain the following gain matrices with a
sub-optimal H1 attenuation level filter = 1:0014:
G =
2664
 0:1261  0:0977  0:9216
 0:1390  0:1271 1:7613
 0:0068  0:0069 0:8752
3775 ;
N = 1011 
2664
 1:8548  0:3760  4:2223
 0:2729 1:2104  2:7377
 0:0158 0:0061  0:0459
3775 ;
M = 1013 
2664
 1:1547  0:1477
 0:3836  0:7682
 0:0100 0:0044
3775 ;
L = 10 3 
"
0:0013  0:0002 0:3009
0:0002 0:0007 0:3156
#
:
In this section, we consider two cases of the actuator faults, one is the failure fault of Pump 1 and
the other one is the failure of Pump 2.
Case 1: Failure of Pump 1, Start from k = 1s, Fault occurs at k = 300s.
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Fig. 4. Packet dropout phenomenon
The experiment results are shown in Figs. 46. Fig. 4 illustrates that whether the packet is missing
during the transmission from sensor to actuator via the network cable. k = 0 means that the
data is missing and k = 1 corresponds to successful transmission. Fig. 5 shows the fault detection
and isolation result. Jk;L is the incremental real-time residual evaluation function, where we set
L = 5. We choose JLth = 220 from Monte Carlo experiments. It can be seen from Fig. 5 that
J322;5 = 225:4296 > J
L
th = 220, which means the failure can be detected at k = 322s by using the
logic (15). The detecting time is 22 s later after the fault occurs.
For the fault isolation, we use the WRCC approach proposed in Subsection III-A.1. For the two
possible failures that may occur in Pump 1 or Pump 2, we set the scalars as 1 = 1, 2 = 0:97.
This can be obtained from some initial experiments. At time instant k = 321s, the one-to-one map
relationship between the weighted ordered array and the possible fault set is as follows:(
OA( J
(1)
321; J
(2)
321) () f (1)k ;
OA( J
(2)
321; J
(1)
321) () f (2)k :
In the present experiment, we have J
(1)
322 = 481:0639 and J
(2)
322 = 471:6604. From the above relation-
ship, we can refer that the fault occurs in pump 1. The bottom gure in Fig. 5 provides the fault
detection and isolation information. The solid line stands for the true fault with 1 for failure of pump
1 and 2 for pump 2. The dashed line shows the fault detection and isolation result with 0 for no fault,
1 for failure of pump 1 and 2 for failure of pump 2.
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Fig. 5. Fault detection and isolation results in Case 1
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Fig. 6. Controlled outputs under controller Kh and KFTC in Case 1
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Fig. 7. Fault detection and isolation results in Case 2
We are now ready to make a comparison between a xed H1 controller Kh and a fault tolerant
controller KFTC in the faulty case. Fig. 6 demonstrates the evolutions of controlled output zk under
both xed controller Kh (red line) and fault tolerant controller KFTC (blue line). It can be seen
that under the xed control law Kh, when there is a failure fault with Pump 1, water levels descend
gradually with time increase and the deviation is more than 7cm after 100s. However, under the fault
tolerant controller (5), although the control performance is worse than that in the fault free case, water
levels can be controlled with an accuracy of 1cm.
Case 2: Failure of Pump 2, Start from k = 1s, Fault occurs at k = 200s.
Experiment results are shown in Figs. 78, which are similar with the results in Case 1. Fig. 7
shows the fault detection and isolation result. For the comparison between a xed H1 controller Kh
and a fault tolerant controller KFTC in the faulty case, Fig. 8 provides the evolutions of controlled
output zk under both xed controller Kh (red line) and fault tolerant controller KFTC (blue line). We
can observe that under the xed control law Kh, when there is a failure fault with Pump 2, the fault
tolerant control strategy can guarantee the scalability of the whole INTTS while the xed controller
cannot.
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Fig. 8. Controlled outputs under controller Kh and KFTC in Case 2
V. Conclusion
INTTS is a benchmark system that can verify networked FDD/FTC algorithms. Based on the
INTTS, this paper has proposed an active fault tolerant control strategy for nonlinear networked
systems with possible actuator failures. A Bernoulli distributed stochastic sequence has been utilized
to describe the random packet dropout introduced by the limited-capacity of network transmission. A
networked fault tolerant control has been designed in an active framework, which includes the design
of a fault detection and isolation unit and a controller reconguration strategy. Real-time experiments
on the real INTTS have been provided and the eectiveness of the proposed technique has been veried
by two cases with actuator failure faults.
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